Price versus quantity: market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality

Metrick, Andrew

Price versus quantity: market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality - Cambridge, MA NBER 1996 - 39p - NBER working paper series .

ISBN:

Dewey Class. No.: WP 5728

Price versus quantity: market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality

APA

Metrick A., Zeckhauser Richard & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (1996). Price versus quantity: market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality. Cambridge, MA: NBER.

Chicago

Metrick Andrew, Zeckhauser Richard and National Bureau Of Economic Research. 1996. Price versus quantity: market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality. Cambridge, MA: NBER.

Harvard

Metrick A., Zeckhauser Richard and National Bureau Of Economic Research. (1996). Price versus quantity: market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality. Cambridge, MA: NBER.

MLA

Metrick Andrew, Zeckhauser Richard and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Price versus quantity: market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality. Cambridge, MA: NBER. 1996.

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